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1 Introduction 
“It is the main proposition of this paper that ... in-
dustrialisation processes, when at length launched in a 
backwards country, showed considerable differences, 
... not only with regard to the speed of development 
(i.e., the rate of industrial growth), but also with re-
spect to the productive and organisational structures of 
industry which emerged from those processes. ... In 
addition, the intellectual climate, within which indus-
trialisation proceeded, its “spirit” or “ideology”, dif-
fered considerably as among advanced and backward 
countries” – Alexander Gerschenkron  
(Gerschenkron 1952, p. 5) 
 
 
In Central European states, the questions of industrialisation have been asked 
numerous times in relation to the European core. Before WW II, industrial under-
development could be linked to the peripheral situation of Central European 
economies, and meaningful parallels could be drawn with the states of Southern 
Europe, who had faced the same problems. With state socialism and its focus on 
catch-up through industrial location, the issue became muddled. To what extent 
was the path taken by Central European states to industrialise comparable to other 
economies on the European periphery, and to what extent was it a specific out-
come of socialist ideology? Furthermore, is it possible to speak about national 
models, or are these variations less significant?  
The role of industry had to be re-evaluated during transformation. Decline in 
employment, economic share and exports was universal, but it is also visible that 
some industrial activities have been able to survive and become a new source of 
growth. In Central Europe’s integration into European and global networks, For-
eign Direct Investment (FDI) has reshaped space; however, it is apparent that the 
dichotomy between old and new industries is a questionable one: even new 
greenfield investments are closely linked to previous production millieus, while 
old industries have often shown ability to be revitalised. Therefore, the spatial 
structure of industry of Central Europe today is a patchwork of continuity and 
change, where convergence towards the core is just as possible as the recreation 
of traditional peripheral relationships. 
In this paper, my aim is to trace the development of Central European industry 
from three aspects: public policy (what was the role of the state in influencing 
industrial growth?), economic development (what role did industry play in na-
tional economies, and how did national models compare to each other and west-
ern examples?) and spatial development (how did industrialisation and de-
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industrialisation processes play out in heterogenous space?). Three major time 
periods are considered: the interwar years, state socialism and the present; and the 
question examined whether they represent breaks in development or continuities 
and organic transitions. In this paper, “Central Europe” refers to European post-
socialist states excluding the successor states of the Soviet Union and the territory 
of the German Democratic Republic. Although these spaces present very 
intriguing questions, their development also poses problems which put them 
outside the scope of my study. In some instances, however, they are mentioned in 
the context of general problems under state socialism. 
The paper is based on the results of a wider research, which used multiple re-
search methods. I used modern and contemporary secondary sources, national and 
regional statistics, as well as a number of planning document during the assembly 
of material. I also consulted with policy experts involved in industrial and re-
gional planning during state socialism and the current period. Although the latter 
two sources are rarely cited in the text, they were invaluable in clarifying and 
correcting my findings, particularly where past events were concerned. Observa-
tions on some regions; Southern Transdanubia, Northern Hungary and Upper 
Silesia (Poland), as well as generalised conclusions are partially based on per-
sonal experience gained during field research. While processing secondary 
sources and statistics, I was confronted with the dilemmas of reliability and accu-
racy. The heterogeneous quality of these materials required a degree of source 
criticism. However, even inaccurate or propagandistic/political sources were of 
worth in contrasting ideology and reality. 
The paper is accompanied by a number of tables and charts. Many of them 
serve to illustrate, expand on and reinforce points made in the text, while the 
maps in the annex represent an independent branch of research findings, whose 
aim is to give readers a “bigger picture” of spatial differentiation in Central Euro-
pean industry. 
2 Industrial development in the interwar period 
2.1 The spatial and political background of industrial development after 
World War One 
Discussions of regional development processes in Central European states com-
monly reference the socialist system as their starting point. These writings cor-
rectly identify the features of the planned economy as having had a strong impact 
on Central European space, but often pay inadequate attention to equally inter-
esting prior events. Industry is a particularly inviting area in this respect: the mas-
sive drive to transform backwards states into industrially advanced ones was the 
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main cornerstone of socialist ideology, and the effects of this drive on the econ-
omy, society and landscape of the region cannot be understated. However, a more 
sobering note from Gerschenkron 1952 (cited on p. 5) warns us that the 
particulars of Central Europe’s industrialisation have deeper roots, and that 
perhaps socialism was a much less clean break with previous patterns than a 
cursory glance suggests. In the following chapter, I do not intend to address the 
full implications of the problems resulting from the agrarian-industrial divide, the 
nationally encouraged industrialisation of the mid to late 19th century or the 
consequences of industry’s inability to absorb surplus agrarian labour; rather, the 
focus is on how economic necessities in the interwar years “primed” economic 
policy for gradually introducing central planning, and how this played out in 
heterogeneous space. 
The spatial arrangements and political climate produced by the peace treaties 
following World War One presented new challenges for industry. The fragmenta-
tion of large pre-war markets and suppliers now divided by strong borders and 
higher tariffs, as well as the political paranoia of small states, resulted in the 
break-up of supplier chains and vertical integrations. We can also see the drive 
towards “national self reliance”, which ultimately became total during WW2 and 
under Stalinism: the triumph of political and military (vis-à-vis economic) ration-
ality leading to sub-optimal decisions such as being forced to use uneconomic 
mineral resources or encouraging the development of superfluous industrial ca-
pacities. Border changes lead to the reorientation of large industrial agglomera-
tions towards new centres of consumption. On the contrary, there was an ever 
increasing need to find external markets for industrial products; small states 
proved unable to fully absorb the output of scale-effective corporations interested 
in growth. This contradiction remained a persistent, insoluble dilemma of inter-
war development. 
Enyedi (1978) points out that in addition to the restrictive influence of new 
borders, Central Europe was hard hit by the falling prices of agricultural products 
on the world market, which lead to agriculture’s diminished role as a source of 
capital accumulation. The remaining source of competitiveness was cheap labour, 
hindering the development of more advanced and capital intensive industrial 
branches (chemical and machine industry) in favour of labour intensive ones (e.g. 
textiles). The response to economic hardship was stronger government interven-
tion. Berend–Ránki (1976) identify four motivating factors which resulted in the 
increasing interest of central control in industrialisation: 
− resources (currency stockpiles and agricultural surplus) were inadequate to 
finance high industrial imports; 
− the falling prices of agricultural products on the world market devalued 
them as a source of generating capital; 
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− states had an increasing need to ensure their highest possible level of inde-
pendence from hostile neighbours; 
− industrial development was seen as the best instrument to combat economic 
backwardness. 
As production indices from these years suggest, these measures were effective 
in encouraging growth, particularly in countries with a low initial development 
level (Table 1), but locked them in outdated structures which helped preserve 
their backwardness (Table 2). 
Table 1 
Indices of industrial production in Central European states 1913–1939 
Year Bulgaria Czecho-
slovakia 
Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia 
1913 1001 100 100 100 100 100 
1929 179 141 112 n/a 137 140 
1932 195 733 84 n/a 122 116 
1939 2452 1074 1285 95 180 190 
Notes: 1 – 1915, 2 – 1937, 3 – 1933, 4 – 1937, 5 – 1938. 
Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of data from Berend–Ránki, 1976. 
Table 2 
The branch structure of industry in Central Europe 1913–1938 (%) 
Branch Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Yugoslavia 
1913 1938 1913 1938 1913 1938 1922 1938 1913 1938 
Metallurgy and machinery 6 3 26 29 20 19 12 17 20 17 
Chemical industry 4 2 8 9 4 8 22 21 3 8 
Textiles, leather and clothing 24 22 11 21 44 16 20 26 9 26 
Food industry 58 51 41 29 18 31 27 23 59 27 
Other 8 22 14 12 14 26 19 13 9 22 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Berend–Ránki, 1976, p. 463. 
State programmes gathered momentum during the 1930s. It begs the question 
how closely the gradual increases in central control and the concept of “controlled 
economy” were related to the institution of central planning in post-war states. 
Réti (1993) and Kıszegfalvi (Lux, 2006) argue that there was a greater degree of 
continuity than usually assumed. Governments responded to the decline of 1929–
1931 and industry’s vulnerability on external markets by tightening their reins on 
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industrial production. The priorities of small states reflected their wish to reduce 
this vulnerability and lessen the effects of Depression; at the same time, they were 
vital for upcoming war preparations. Last but not least, the location of military 
production in backwards areas coincided with regional development initiatives 
(c.f. chapter 2.2). Réti draws attention to the lessening influence of private capital 
in charting the directions of industry as a social consequence of state involve-
ment. Wartime economy, which he considers the logical conclusion to the proc-
ess, is independent of both the world market and the desires of the citizenry of the 
state. 
In addition to state control, we must draw attention to the role of foreign capi-
tal in industrial development. Capital import was instrumental before WW I, and 
remained important afterwards, especially in underdeveloped economies where it 
controlled 50–60% of total industrial production. The primary investors were 
Great Britain, the USA, France and Germany; the Czech Republic was a smaller 
regional player with strong interests in Yugoslavia. In the 1930s, German interests 
increased in conjunction with the Schacht Plan, and were gradually able to exert 
influence over the industrial policy of aligned countries.1 
2.2 Spatial consequences and regional development patterns 
The re-division of Central European space also repositioned its advanced and 
peripheral regions. Due to the hard borders, globally insignificant industrial cen-
tres (such as Miskolc in Hungary) became vital in national economies, while oth-
ers (such as Košíce in Czechoslovakia) declined. The new states showed much 
deeper gaps in development level than the pre-war empires, and territorial inte-
gration – hindered among other reasons by weak transport connections, cultural 
differences and ethnical inhomogeneity – became a pressing concern for national 
governments, for whom these factors were closely intertwined. As Gulyás (2005, 
p. 23) remarks, “the political elite of a state either treats a region as a milking 
cow, economically exploiting it, or, for some reason, strives for its development. 
In Central Europe, this question is further complicated by the fact that the devel-
opment of a region is fundamentally influenced by its ethnical makeup. Practi-
cally, we can speak about the confluence of economic policy, regional policy and 
the nationality question. … In the end, the balance of development in regions 
                                                     
1
 In South-eastern Europe, which included Greece and Hungary, Germany consciously opposed 
industrial development initiatives, preferring countries in this space to be agricultural producers 
(Gulyás 2005). A concrete example of this influence is the case of the Danube steel processing 
plant. The Hungarian government allocated 1 billion pengı for the project in 1938, but put the 
project on hold due to German demands. The steel combine was eventually built during the first 
Five Year Plan (Lux 2006). 
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whose population was not represented in the nationally dominant political elite, 
was unambiguously negative, resulting in either stagnation or decline.” In short, 
ethnicity was a location factor, leading to preferred or dispreferred status. Ethnical 
preferences lead to especially strong contradictions where highly developed in-
dustrial regions with a strong minority presence were incorporated into less de-
veloped states (e.g. Upper Silesia, Southern Transylvania). 
The patterns of industrial development varied from state to state. Czechoslova-
kia, whose western half was the most advanced constituent of the Austro–
Hungarian Monarchy, retained its lead in Central Europe, inheriting 50% of the 
Monarchy’s coal and steel capacities, 72% of its textile industry and 84% of its 
glassworking (Berend–Ránki, 1976). This advantage is even more impressive 
when we consider that the Depression had the strongest effect here (c.f. Table 1), 
and that this development level concealed significant regional inequalities show-
ing a west-east development gradient (Table 3). Czechoslovakia was overindus-
trialised for its market possibilities, leading to a sort of internal “cannibalism” – in 
the 1920s, the dominant Czech elite successfully realised its interests to de-indus-
trialise Slovakia, resulting in the loss of 250 factories and approximately 30,000 
jobs (Gulyás 2005; for more detailed figures, see Kazimour 1981). Similarly, the 
effects of Depression were uneven, hitting harder in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathia. 
Table 3 
Industrialisation and urbanisation in Czechoslovakia, 1921 
Region Employment in industry and crafts 
(%) 
Urban population 
(%) 
Bohemia 40.55 22.30 
Moravia 37.79 21.90 Silesia 15.90 
Slovakia 17.43 11.10 
Sub-Carpathia 10.41 11.10 
Total 33,80 18.90 
Source: Gulyás 2005, p. 69. 
Similar differences were present in Poland. The independent Polish state in-
corporated regions from three empires whose trade relations were very weak be-
fore WW I.2 Lijewski (1985) argues that the essential difference fell between the 
Monarchy and the Russian Empire, characterised by a lesser number of centres 
                                                     
2
 Of the total trade flows generated by the three zones, only 7.4% crossed borders, while 84.5% was 
consumed within the respective state and 8.1% was exported to the world market (Berend – Ránki 
1976). 
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strongly separated from the underdeveloped countryside, and Germany, where 
development was more even, and every significant urban centre was also a loca-
tion of modern industrial activity. In the interwar years, the inherited differences 
lived on, although a weak deconcentration tendency is also visible as the northern 
and eastern voivodeship showed rapid growth – although inadequate to genuinely 
change the face of the country (Figure 1).  
Figure 1 
The growth of industrial employment on the current territory of Poland, 
1925–1938 (%) 
 
Note: Map B shows the location of the Central Industrial District within the current and interwar 
borders of Poland. 
Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of data from Misztal 1970. 
The Polish government was among the first in Europe to adopt regional plan-
ning, resulting in the 1936–1940 Kwiatkowski plan to absorb surplus labour and 
develop new industries (aeronautics, machine, chemical and arms industry). The 
investments, which were equally divided between armament and general eco-
nomic improvement, affected 15% of the state’s territory and concentrated 25% 
of national investments in 1937–1938 and 50% in 1939. The plan was not consid-
ered final, and Kwiatkowski himself advocated three more five-year plans after its 
completion (Dziewoński 1989, Malikowski 1994). 
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Hungary lost three of its large industrial regions (the Uplands to Czechoslova-
kia, Southern Transylvania and the Banat to Romania) in the post-war settlement, 
which also levied severe war reparations and resulted in the distortion of the 
country’s regional development. Budapest was the only strong industrial region 
within the new borders, while others of secondary or tertiary importance 
(Northern Hungary, Northern Transdanubia) had to be developed as a substitute. 
Budapest was dominant: in 1938, 61.9% of all industrial workers and 41.9% of 
production was located there (also see Figure 2). Outside Budapest, the 
dominance of the “energy axis” in the northern part of the country – concentrating 
heavy industry and dominant until 1990 – can be observed. 
Figure 2 
The level of mechanisation (in horse power) and the number of industrial 
sites in Hungary (1938) 
 
Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of data from Berend–Ránki, 1958. 
Hungarian industry’s relative backwardness increased before WW II; the suc-
cess of select companies couldn’t counteract the maturing of previously innova-
tive activities; new branches were slow to emerge and remained small, especially 
after Germany started to force the country into the role of an agricultural supplier. 
The state started to play a stronger role as it was preparing for war, both through 
its demand for industrial goods and through establishing new production facilities. 
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The latter was realised in smaller, scattered units primarily in what is now Central 
Transdanubia. Tatai (in Rechnitzer – Tatai 1995) considers these to be the most 
important progenitors of later industrial districts, especially in the case of Székes-
fehérvár. 
Romania was in several respects similar to Poland, sharing its weak interior 
cohesion and high development differences. Heavy and processing industry was 
especially strong in Southern Transylvania (Hunedoara, Braşov) and the Banat 
(ReşiŃa, Timişoara, Arad), while Old Romania was characterised by the domi-
nance of oil mining and petrochemical industry.3 This also meant a difference in 
ownership – with a higher and lower share of domestic capital, respectively. Out-
side these spheres, industry was scattered, undercapitalised and overwhelmingly 
traditional in character. Turnock (1970) shows that spatial development patterns 
remained constant despite the presence of state intervention, and industry re-
mained concentrated in a “half-moon” situated between Bucharest and Timişoara. 
The states of the Balkans (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania) were similar in 
their underdevelopment. Industrial employment was low, and outside developed 
islands and a few exceptional regions (e.g. the Slovenian Republic, with 8% of 
Yugoslavia’s population but 38% of its textile and metal industries), it was re-
stricted to labour-intensive branches such as food industry and textiles. The min-
eral resources of the peninsula were attractive to foreign mining concessions, but 
these developments were insular, the raw materials usually exported for lack of 
domestic processing capacities. All in all, while growth was reasonably dynamic 
– Bulgaria’s industrial output doubled between 1921 and 1929 – it was only so 
because of an extremely low base (Kenessey 1964, Gulyás 2005). 
3 Industrial development under state socialism 
3.1 Stalinism in space: ideology, development priorities 
and consequences 
The ideology of Stalinism, whose influence became total in the second half of the 
1940s, introduced a previously unknown homogeneity in economic policy just as 
it did in all other spheres of society. The ideology of the Stalinist state denied the 
possibility of local or national particulars in favour of a common goal, the devel-
opment of heavy industry. Industrialisation was seen as a solution to three major 
needs: post-war reconstruction and rearmament, creating autonomous production 
capacities in lieu of western imports, and finally, demonstrating the valid-
                                                     
3
 The Romanian mineral oil industry occupied the 5th–6th position in the world in this period (Réti 
1993). 
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ity/superiority of the socialist ideology through the transformation of the land-
scape. This ideology, based on geographical nihilism and social determinism 
(Hajdú 1999) proposed that all problems were common, and implied that space 
and its possibilities were homogenous.  
The recipe was adapted from the Soviet example to Central European circum-
stances. Markos (1951) sums up the spatial goals of Stalinism in three points: 
− preference for heavy industry and industrial branches manufacturing means 
of production over other types of industry and branches producing con-
sumption goods; 
− division of work among companies based on the duality of profiling 
(specialisation) and planned cooperation; 
− the balanced distribution of industry in space and the industrialisation of 
backwards areas. 
In a later work (Markos, 1962), he further elaborates the practical concerns of 
realising these goals in a real (differentiated) environment: 
− industrial branches with a high need for raw resources or energy should be 
located in their proximity at a point where transportation costs are minimal; 
− developments should primarily be undertaken in backwards regions; 
− long-distance cross-transportation should be reduced by local sourcing to 
the greatest extent; 
− the security of the state should enjoy a privilege; strategic industries should 
be located in the heartlands. 
In practice, the development of Stalinism played out in highly variable space, 
and had to conform to political realities. Every other priority was subordinated to 
security concerns and war preparations, while spatially balanced development 
took a backseat. Decisions were made on the basis of political or military ration-
ality which was economically irrational. The need for heavy industry to be located 
in the proximity of natural resources (labour was a mobile production factor in the 
period) resulted in the prioritisation of existing industrial agglomerations, even if 
a few new growth poles were created elsewhere. To cite two examples, 44.7% of 
new jobs in Hungarian industry were created in Budapest between 1949 and 1953 
(Kóródi–Márton, 1968), while in Poland, three voivodeships (Katowice, Kraków 
and Łódz) received 54% of all industrial investments between 1951 and 1960 
(Zawadski, 1965). Similar figures could be cited for all socialist states, especially 
the less developed ones. Instead of eliminating pre-war differences, Stalinism 
recreated and reinforced them, polarising preferred industrial regions and ne-
glected peripheries. 
On the regional level, there was a marked increase in monofunctionality. 
Mining areas and heavy industrial centres already saw one-sided development 
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before the war, but this situation was exacerbated by the decline of supplementary 
industries and strictly enforced production profiles. The urbanisation of early 
socialism was rapid, but it was accompanied by shortages of housing, communal 
infrastructure, services and products, which had to be supplied by the employers 
or workers. Hidden unemployment became a problem, especially among women 
who were now increasingly entering the labour market. These troubles can be 
traced back to the dysfunctions of development policy. Due to the inadequacy of 
public funds, modernisation was often partial in industrial regions, moving on to 
other areas after creating the barest necessities. Pockets of underdevelopment 
became preserved under a superficially “developed” surface. The most extreme 
cases of partial modernisation could be seen in some coal and steel regions, where 
the dysfunctions of what was at that time recognised as “extensive development” 
were never addressed, and which became the worst crisis areas in the post-social-
ist economy. 
If the interwar decades were characterised by economic fragmentation, Stalin-
ism made this situation universal and extreme. The entirety of the socialist block 
except Yugoslavia was isolated from the world economy, and despite the com-
mon ideological ground, states also functioned as self-sufficient autarchic entities 
to the greatest possible extent. Flows between the Soviet Union and its satellites 
(which included bilateral exchanges, war reparations and the transfer of know-
how) were an exception, but multilateral trade among the smaller socialist coun-
tries was at a nadir.4 The consequences of dual isolation on spatial development 
were severe, leading to even more inefficient parallel industrialisation and the 
exploitation of uneconomic natural resources. 
How can we evaluate the effects of Stalinism on industrial development? To 
an extent, it was not as distant from global trends as sometimes suggested. The 
1950s were also a period of industrialisation in Western Europe and industry was 
seen as a useful tool of modernising backwards peripheries such as the Italian 
Mezzogiorno. The difference was that in Central Europe, industrialisation took 
place in a highly irrational environment, where ideology (taming/remaking nature 
as a heroic ideal) and military needs totally repressed economic rationality. The 
results were often oversized, ignored real demands and were troubled by inherent 
dysfunctions which incurred further costs in the following decades. 
3.2 Industry under consolidated state socialism 
From the second half of the 1950s, it became apparent that the previous policies 
were unsustainable, leading to a wave of reforms across the socialist sphere. Re-
                                                     
4
 The COMECON, although formally created in 1949, lacked an effective charter until 1959, and its 
operations were extremely restricted. 
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forms played out differently in different countries; we can see divergent national 
paths, which ranged from controlled experiments in reintroducing some market 
incentives as in Hungary, to staying close to the Stalinist model as in Romania. 
None of the reforms could go beyond the hard limits of the socialist system, as 
Czechoslovakia’s example demonstrated. If there were victories, they would be 
small ones in the eyes of an outsider. We can speak not of radically transforming 
socialist development policy, but correcting and supplementing it; more modern 
and rational capacities were created, and older ones modernised, but all this co-
existed with previously built structures until transformation. Although the defin-
ing characteristic of reforms was divergent development, there were four common 
elements: 
− transferring some economic control from direct command to intermediate 
organs, 
− technological change (switch from “19th century” coal-and-steel industry 
towards hydrocarbons, chemical industry, electronics, etc.), 
− increasing cooperation and specialisation among socialist states, some de-
crease in their economic isolation 
− the emergence of regional policy as a corrective instrument. 
All of these played a role in territorial decentralisation. Lessening the control 
of central planning gave some power the regional level. Bauer and Szamuely 
(1979), in their comparison of socialist planning systems, conclude that industry 
saw a period of decentralisation which was subsequently followed by increasing 
central control, and that in the 1970s, the end result was the division of power 
among central institutions, intermediate bodies and individual companies. They 
propose that this arrangement, where substantial decisions were usually made on 
the intermediate level, was the stabilised outcome of institutional reforms in 
planned economies. Stabilisation also meant ossification; after the winding-down 
of the reform period, most planning systems remained relatively stable until trans-
formation. 
The switch to oil and gas as leading energy sources, but also less resource-
intensive production, decreased the needs for resource proximity and transporta-
tion; consequently, allowed more evenly distributed industrial location. This also 
meant that industry could be more readily used as a tool of regional policy, lo-
cated on sources of labour instead of raw resources. Instead of a small number of 
larger growth poles, socialist development policy was able to support multiple 
lesser ones: small cities or large villages. But technological change didn’t re-
structure existing industrial regions. Instead, we can speak of “layered” industrial 
structures, where older, outdated and energy-hungry activities coexisted with 
later, more modern ones. As Greenspan (2007) points out, Schumpeterian crea-
tive destruction was missing from the mechanisms of the socialist economy. 
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Building new industry was prioritised over modernising the existing one; and 
when the latter received state money, it mostly went into structural preservation. 
Economic cooperation and specialisation was a troublesome issue. On one 
hand, specialised national production profiles were recognised to be potential 
sources of increased efficiency. On the other hand, national interests in less de-
veloped states advocated complex autonomous industrial capacities and moderni-
sation through mutual technology transfers. The debate soon became one about 
national sovereignty. In 1962, the Valev Plan, a Soviet initiative proposed the 
deeper integration of socialist states along the Danube River, but Romania sternly 
rejected its recommended agricultural and petrochemical role in the arrangement 
and reduced COMECON participation after 1964 (for the initial concept, see 
Valev, 1964; for further development, Turnock, 1986 and Gulyás, 2005). Produc-
tion profiles were eventually realised in a significantly weaker form than initially 
imagined. Data collected from different sources suggests that even with all ef-
forts, the share of intra-COMECON trade in the total only increased by 1.8% 
from 1960 to 1970, and “products for energy” agreements between the Soviet 
Union and its satellites dominated exchange vis-à-vis deeper integration among 
the smaller member states. We can instead point to the growing role of extra-
block trade after 1970, with western and third world countries (Table 4). The dual 
isolation of socialist economies remained, but weaker than the freeze of the Sta-
linist years. 
Table 4 
The share of COMECON markets in the trade of socialist states, 1950–1979 (%) 
State 1950 1960 1972 1979 
Albania*  88.9 41.1  
Bulgaria  80.7 80.2 75.7 
Czechoslovakia 55.6 63.8 71.3 67.2 
GDR   71.0 65.8 
Hungary   68.1 52.0 
Poland 58.4 56.6 62.3 54.7 
Romania 89.2 65.8 53.7 35.4 
Soviet Union   64.5 51.9 
All members 61.8 60.8 62.6 n/a 
* Albania withdrew from the COMECON in 1961, but increased its trade with China from 7 to 36% 
(Böröczfy, 1975). 
Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of data from Meisel 1974, Böröczfy 1975 and Peche 
1982. 
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Regional policy from the 1960s was specifically an instrument aiming to ad-
dress problems of inequal development (as opposed to general economic devel-
opment policy, which also had an effect on space). With a few exceptions, such as 
Hungary, where agricultural cooperatives also played a significant role, its main 
tool was industrial location. Labour-intensive industries were developed in small 
towns and sometimes rural areas, both as a social measure and a response to de-
creasing labour mobility. In the process, going back to previously neglected local 
knowledge and light industrial traditions was not uncommon. Among Central 
European socialist states, Poland and Hungary used the broadest range of policy 
instruments (Table 5). It is notable that many of these tools are testament to de-
creasing central control and movement towards less direct intervention. Of 
course, regional policy remained subordinate to national planning directives, and 
at its most successful, it was a corrective instrument generating growth outside 
existing structures. In industrial regions, the effects were rather meagre. Although 
“one-sided development” was discussed in contemporary works (e.g. Bartke 1971 
and Kóródi–Kıszegfalvi, 1971), policy only succeeded in alleviating the problems 
of the 1950s – gaps between urban needs and infrastructure, hidden unemploy-
ment among women and (very rarely) the reindustrialisation of smaller areas af-
fected by mine closures. 
Table 5 
Regional development instruments at the end of the 1960s 
Instrument Bulgaria Czecho-
slovakia 
GDR Hungary Poland Yugosla-
via 
Soviet 
Union 
Preferential credit condi-
tions  X  X X X  
One-time investment con-
tribution  X  X X   
Differentiated tax and wage 
contributions, cost subsi-
dies 
 X  X*  X X 
Differentiated public works 
costs and communal taxes X   X X  X 
Differentiated land prices 
and land use fees    X X X X 
Industrial parks, infrastruc-
tural development   X    X 
Differentiated pricing and 
tariff policies     X X X 
*Encouraging industrial location close to labour by requiring companies to pay commuting costs 
(Bartke 1971). 
Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of Kóródi – Márton 1968 and Bartke 1971. 
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3.3 Spatial development trajectories: convergence, divergence, convergence 
As discussed in 3.1, the results of Stalinism were national homogenisation and 
regional polarisation. Development policies converged to the point of being 
nearly identical. Socialist states, separated by wide development gaps, became 
more similar to each other. At the same time, the difference between preferred 
and neglected regions was enormous. Those who were excluded from central 
redistribution were truly marginalised, unable even to properly reconstruct and 
maintain their interwar industries. Globally speaking, it was a multiplication of 
the same pattern; common development at enormous costs. By the mid 1950s, the 
unsustainability of this growth model was self-evident, requiring extensive re-
forms. 
How did the reforms influence the spatial structure of industry? Looking at 
Annexes I./a and I./b, we can see that the most industrialised regions were still 
pre-war ones. As discussed by Enyedi (1978), the majority of industrial employ-
ment before WW II was concentrated into an upwards triangle bordered by lines 
drawn between Łódz, Erfurt and Budapest. In 1970–1971, this formation was still 
strongly visible, although some counties in Romania had joined them – although 
at severe costs. It is notable that Yugoslavia and Hungary both show a low level 
of industrial employment. The reasons are partly methodological: in both coun-
tries, a share of industry (some 10–15% in Hungary), was under the control of 
municipalities or cooperatives. Additionally, in Hungary’s case, the concentration 
of Budapest, accounting for 34% of employment and 23% of total investments, is 
contrasted by a more “empty” countryside.5 
Overall, the share of employment in industry and construction reached an av-
erage of 51% by 1970–1971. Among the examined states, the differences are not 
excessive: the higher figures of Czechoslovakia (55%), Romania (53%) and Po-
land (52%) and the lowest of Yugoslavia (47%), Albania (46%) and Hungary 
(46%) are relatively close; this points to convergence compared to the more po-
larised pre-war conditions. Outside central regions and Katowice voivodeship, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary show a relatively even spatial distribution 
of employment, while southern and south-eastern states have higher differences. 
Where the share of industrial employment reflects the contemporary situation 
of industrial development in socialist states, per capita investments expressed in 
US dollar values offer an insight into development priorities. Naturally, Annex 
I./b can only give a snapshot, and may be distorted by high-priority projects; nev-
ertheless, these anomalies do not affect the big picture. Poland and Romania stand 
out with high investment volumes, while Bulgaria shows a lower level. In Hun-
gary, the “energy axis” of industrialised counties is apparent, while in Romania, 
                                                     
5
 Outside Budapest, Sofia city (16%), Southern and Northern Moravia (14 and 15%), Katowice 
(20%) and Bucharest (16%) count as Central Europe’s super-concentrations. 
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there is a strong divide between Transylvania and Old Romania. In Czechoslova-
kia, investments were divided between the Czech and Slovakian sides along 
population lines; by this time, programmes aimed at Slovakia’s catch-up had al-
ready concluded. 
Two decades under state socialism, even if development priorities and plan-
ning had changed over time, were not without consequences. Although industri-
alisation was unable to reshape the map of Central European industry like it in-
tended to, states had become closer, even when the divergence of policies in the 
reform period is taken into account. The question arises if the results are specific 
to the socialist model, or comparable to peripheral and agrarian regions of 
Europe. Evidence suggests that while the Stalinist policies of the 1950s were a 
detour from the path taken by market economies, reforms in the 1960s lessened 
these differences.6 The political retrenchment of the late 1960s halted the conver-
gence process: over the next two decades, policy became fossilised and again 
increasingly homogenous due to political pressures, while damaged adaptation 
mechanisms lead to increasing differences between western and Central European 
economies.  
States experienced the convergence–divergence–convergence shift of indus-
trial development in different ways during socialism. Czechoslovakia, which suf-
fered relatively little during the war, had Central Europe’s most advanced indus-
try beside the GDR. Losses in the Czech parts were primarily in human capital 
(war deaths and the deportation of Jews and Germans), while physical damage 
was higher in the Slovakian federal republic. The early reconstruction plans pro-
posed modernisation in industrialised regions and building new industries on pe-
ripheries. However, in 1949 and 1950, these plans were scrapped in favour of a 
few large projects, primarily enlarging existing industrial agglomerations (espe-
cially Ostrava–Karvina, where two giant steel combines were constructed). Slo-
vakian industrialisation focused on metallurgy in Košice and military industry in 
more dispersed locations.  
The regional differences between Czech and Slovakian areas only began to be 
treated under the second Five Year Plan (1956–1960). Slovakia’s industrial pro-
duction in 1960 was still 10.6% below its population weight, while by 1970, the 
gap fell to 7.6%, and by 1979, to 3.6% (c.f. Figure 3). This equalisation was both 
politically expedient (reducing tensions between Slovakian and Czech elites)7, 
                                                     
6
 My interviews with Hungarian experts active in planning during the socialist period revealed that 
they were familiar with Western theories of economic development, and were consciously trying 
to adapt them to the local economic circumstances and political realities – not always an easy 
thing. 
7
 On the other hand, we have to remark that with respect to Slovakia’s excluded Hungarian 
minority, development policy was discriminatory and consciously assimilationist. Economic 
nationalism, an unmentioned side of socialism, affected all minority groups in Central Europe. In 
Czechoslovakia’s case, districts with a Hungarian majority received 70–75% less investments per 
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and economically rational by prioritising backwards regions with a labour surplus 
instead of advanced ones suffering from increasing shortages. In subsequent five 
year plans, the development of peripheries occurred through new heavy industrial 
units. Slovakia’s specialisation in military industry remained a strong direction. 
Figure 3 
The distribution of industrial production between the Czech and Slovak Socialist 
Republics, 1937–1979 
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Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of data from Kazimour, 1981. 
Poland’s industry had to be extensively rebuilt after the war due to new bor-
ders, destruction and steep human costs.8 The post-war years were a time of large 
migrations, the reconstruction of ruined cities and industrial rebuilding. Plans had 
to integrate new territories and compensate for lost eastern ones, and find a solu-
tion to the divide between industrialised south-western and backwards north-east-
ern voivodeships. In the Six Year Plan (1950–1955), this objective was mostly 
rhetorical. Most new investments were realised in Upper Silesia and Poland’s 
industrial cities (Warsaw, Łódz, Wrocław, Pozńan; to a lesser extent Bydgoszcz 
and Gdańsk–Gdynia), mostly situated in developed regions. Even new towns – 
Nowa Huta and Tychy – served to reinforce already developed areas. 
We can see the contrast between earlier and later development priorities in 
Figure 4. After 1957, Polish planning was decentralised, and in addition to central  
                                                                                                                                     
capita than those with a Slovakian majority; industrial units in Southern Slovakia were preferably 
located in towns with a majority Slovakian population (Gulyás 2005). 
8
 Jews in the textile industry of Łódz and Germans/Silesians in Upper Silesia carried a lot of the 
know-how which became unavailable to socialist Poland. 
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Figure 4 
Industrial location patterns in Poland, 1945–1966 and 1966–1982 
 
Note: 1 – Fixed capital over 100 million złoty; 2 – Fixed capital over 1 billion złoty (both in 1970 
prices). 
Source: Lijewski 1985, pp. 200–201. 
 
 
 23
spatial planning, voivodeships received considerable autonomy in setting their 
objectives. Like in Hungary, decentralised industrialisation’s aim was to absorb 
labour surplus in small towns and agricultural areas. These investments were 
relatively “cheap” to realise, but became very successful in combating hidden 
unemployment. Larger investments also affected less developed regions: the re-
development of the former Central Industrial District took place in the second half 
of 1950s, Płock’s petrochemical facilities were built up from 1959. Most new 
industrial units were located in medium–sized towns with a population between 
20,000 and 100,000. By the 1970s, decentralisation was running out of steam; 
strategic plans aiming at restructuring and the development of new agglomera-
tions were shelved because of insufficient funds. The largest project of this later 
period was the construction of the massive Huta Katowice in Dąbrowa Górnicza 
from 1972. 
In addition to war losses, Hungary was burdened by reparations and the un-
certain ownership of its industry. German property, which included assets seized 
from Jewish owners, was owned and managed by the Red Army, while in strate-
gic branches, mixed Hungarian–Soviet ownership was established (“maszov-
companies”). Soviet or mixed use involved an estimated 90% of light industrial 
plants and a significant share of heavy industry. These capacities were eventually 
bought back by the state during the 1950s. The development goals of Stalinist 
Hungary initially included the industrialisation of the agricultural Great Plains 
through labour–intensive branches, but like elsewhere, these ideas were rejected 
in favour of a few large projects. Kıszegfalvi (Lux, 2006) mentions four priori-
ties: 
− a massive steel combine on the Danube and the construction of the new city 
Sztálinváros (now Dunaújváros), where machine industry was also located; 
− coal mining for industrial purposes, including the exploitation of low–yield 
coalfields; 
− military industry, including the militarization of several civilian factories; 
− machine industry (mining and agricultural equipment). 
These priorities worked against balanced spatial development; in fact, the main 
architect of Hungary’s decentralised spatial development plan received a prison 
sentence for his troubles (Germuska, 2004). The result of Stalinist development 
was strong concentration; the capital received 44.7% of new jobs created between 
1949 and 1953, while the Great Plains only 12.7% (Kóródi–Márton, 1968). 
The late 1950s saw institutional reforms. Central control gradually decreased, 
and in the 1960s, market incentives were introduced in limited degrees. Industry 
was consolidated into larger corporations, leading to the formation of multi-
branch companies which became dominant in the second period of the socialist 
economy. Multi-branch companies typically had headquarters in Budapest 
(sometimes in large cities), and they collectively employed 400,000 workers in 
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more than 600 settlements by 1978 (Barta, 2005). Agricultural cooperatives, 
which were reformed in the 1960s, also became involved in labour-intensive in-
dustrial production, especially goods which were in short supply. “Frozen” ideas 
of regional development were revived. Most small towns and numerous large 
villages gained some sort of industry, often by the resurrection of old traditions. 
This became essential when labour was becoming increasingly less mobile and 
agricultural workers left their jobs to work in industry. Still, commuting, even 
temporary migration was significant, often over very long distances. 
The dark side of modernisation on the peripheries was its vulnerability. 
Branches, as well as small–town companies, were severely undercapitalised and 
used outdated technologies. They were very successful by the standards of the 
period, essentially eliminating rural unemployment, but economically fragile: 
most branch plants failed after 1990, while the rest were/are increasingly margin-
alised in global competition. 
Romania’s industry wasn’t heavily damaged, but like Hungary, Soviet and 
mixed ownership became the highest among socialist states. “Sovroms” were 
especially significant in Romania’s oil mining (36% of output, refining and re-
serves), but otherwise ranged from lumber to uranium extraction. The Romanian 
government only had a limited sovereignty in economic policy, and in fact, recon-
struction and the 1951–1955 Five Year Plan were executed in parallel by state 
organs and Soviet military government. The former prioritised heavy industry, 
while the second was more interested in fuels and raw resources. The end result, 
as elsewhere, was the strengthening of traditional mining and industrial regions; 
Southern Transylvania (Braşov, renamed Oraşul Stalin between 1950 and 1960 
and Hunedoara’s metalworking industry were especially prominent), the Jiu val-
ley, ReşiŃa and Ploieşti. Between 1954 and 1956, the sovroms were gradually sold 
back to the state; at the same time, development was refocused from fuel industry 
to heavier emphasis on metallurgy (Markos, 1951; Turnock, 1970; Réti, 1993). 
Instead of economic reforms, Romania embarked on nationalist Stalinism un-
der Nicolae Ceauşescu. Rigid central planning remained in effect, and the priori-
ties of development policy were still focused on extensive industrialisation. After 
its partial withdrawal from the COMECON over the Valev-plan (Valev 1964, 
Turnock, 1970, 1986), the country was becoming increasingly isolated, and con-
tinued the autarchic initiatives which were typical in the 1950s. In space, devel-
opment was focused on the lagging Old Romanian counties; individual invest-
ments were smaller and more dispersed than previously. The aim of this initiative 
was a homogenous development level linked by national energy networks; how-
ever, the result was the recreation of atavistic, extremely inefficient structures 
which were responsible for severe environmental degradation (Turnock, 1986; 
Hunya, 1987). 
In contrast with other socialist economies, Yugoslavia was fast to break with 
traditional Stalinism. In 1949, the Five Year Plan was modified, and in 1951, 
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long-term planning was effectively discontinued. Industry was reorganised on the 
basis of company self-management. Serbia kept its political leadership among 
member republics, but there was a strong attempt to economically develop others, 
particularly poor ones. Between 1938 and 1963, the share of Bosnia–Herzego-
vina, Macedonia and Montenegro increased from 8.8% to 19% in industrial pro-
duction, but deep divides remained in existence. 
In the 1960s, the Yugoslavian system moved towards (regional and company-
level) decentralisation, and then disintegration. The 1965 reforms ceded addi-
tional power to member republics, developing a many-layered planning system 
with federal, republic, municipal and company levels. The development of back-
wards republics continued; Bosnia-Herzegovina became a hub for heavy industry. 
Although additional reforms between 1971 and 1975 attempted to encourage ter-
ritorial cohesion by company integration and regional (primarily industrial) pol-
icy, the “southern”, less developed republics fell behind in development and their 
growth slowed after 1965. Federal redistribution gradually became highly con-
tested; Mihailović (1985) argues that Yugoslavia, instead of being successfully 
decentralised, became “a cohabitation of eight centralisms” linked by weakening 
economic ties. Last but not least, the increasing prices of metals on the world 
market had a deleterious effect on Yugoslavia’s import-dependent heavy industry; 
in effect, it experienced the economic crisis of the socialist system earlier than 
other states. 
Bulgaria’s main problem was its historical underdevelopment. The establish-
ment of the planned economy went smoothly, but the aims of industrialisation had 
to take the country’s backwardness into account. Accordingly, the central aim 
wasn’t metallurgy (which received 13% of funds during the Five Year Plan), but 
the base industries allowing the economy to move towards it (energy production 
had a share of 31%). Only by 1960 was there a sufficient foundation to begin the 
construction of the Kremikovtzi Steel Complex near Sofia City, which employed 
18,000 workers by 1972 (Palairet, 1995). The development of Bulgaria involved 
high resource concentration into the capital, and to a lesser extent Dimitrovgrad, a 
new town near Haskovo. 
In the later period, the Bulgarian planning system was especially volatile, with 
multiple waves of reform and retrenchment. Briefly, the country experimented 
with Soviet-style regional government (abolishing sectoral in favour of complex 
regional plans and disbanding eight central ministries; competences were dele-
gated to the executive committees of thirty districts), but this radical redesign was 
gradually diluted and the practice discontinued. The next reform wave was based 
on market incentives and organisational consolidation9, while in 1974, ministerial 
control was re-established and industry organised on the principle of “national”, 
                                                     
9
 In 1971, the totality of Bulgarian industry fell under the aegis of 66 “state economic organisations” 
(Bauer–Szamuely, 1979). 
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later “spatial-productive” complexes (Bauer–Szamuely, 1979; Najdenova–Popov, 
1984). During all this institutional chaos, Bulgaria strengthened its heavy 
industry, although it was costly and extremely inefficient. The situation was more 
favourable in electronics assembly and machine industry.10 Industry was spatially 
concentrated in production, with Sofia province and Sofia City accounting for 
50%, but balanced in employment, where the aforementioned areas weighed in at 
15.6% in 1985. 
Albanian industry was characterised by extreme backwardness through the pe-
riod, as well as increasing political and economic isolation. In the 1950s, a com-
bination of Stalinism and self-management based on Yugoslavia’s example domi-
nated; later, the country imported all of its technologies from China, only to break 
these ties as well in the mid 1970s. 
4 Industrial development beyond transformation 
4.1 Crisis and decline after the fall of socialism 
With the collapse of the socialist system and the dissolution of COMECON mar-
kets, Central Europe’s industrial regions had to reposition themselves in the 
framework of the global economy. They needed to compete on Western Euro-
pean, global, and increasingly on domestic markets, while also having to face the 
economic and social consequences of impeded (postponed) industrial restructur-
ing (Audretsch et al. 2000). Although the resulting depression was sometimes 
seen as a system-specific problem, reflected in the popular image of post-socialist 
states as “economic deserts plagued by general decay” (Domański, 2004b, p. 
377), its symptoms and underlying causes were similar to the experiences of west-
ern Old Industrial Regions (OIRs). Market loss, plant closures, social disintegra-
tion and environmental strain were not inherently (post-)socialist problems, nor 
were the immediate causes: outdated products and the failure of regions to adapt 
to new circumstances. These aspects of industrial depression were thoroughly 
dissected in regional studies and other disciplines. If we talk about differences, we 
may not find them in the general features of depression, but rather three factors 
which had made it more severe. 
The first of these is the dysfunctional spatial consequences of socialist eco-
nomic policy (discussed in detail in chapter 3.1). Extensive industrialisation was 
                                                     
10
 In the late 1980s, the Kremikovtzi Steel Complex required its ore and coke to be imported, took 
15% of Bulgaria’s energy consumption, was its largest polluter and generated only 1% of its 
production value.  In turn, electronics’ share in production value was a full 12%; together with 
machine building, it provided 55% of Bulgaria’s export value in 1982 (Hunya, 1987; Curtis, 
1992). 
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able to create new industrial centres in Central Europe, but didn’t have the ability 
to build complex regional economies. The resulting urban centres were strongly 
monofunctional, characterised by a small number of large employers and a lack of 
economic alternatives. Modernised peripheral areas, sometimes the location of 
new cities, were in an even more disadvantaged situation, since their modernisa-
tion was very one-sided. Policy didn’t justify the creation of small and medium 
enterprises. Some of them survived into the planned economy where they had pre-
war traditions, but in heavy industrial regions, these traditions were often weak or 
nonexistent. All in all, the result was a strong culture of dependence, surpassing 
western examples. In many cases, the reliance on large companies extended to 
municipal services (heating, infrastructure, etc.) and public institutions due to 
inadequate urbanisation. When companies no longer had the money to fund them, 
their burden fell on the shoulders of cash-strapped local authorities who already 
had to deal with economic disintegration. Finally, “layered industrialisation”, the 
practice of leaving outdated Stalinist and even pre-war factories in place lead to 
the worst crises in Central Europe – often the total collapse of the local economy. 
The second factor is damaged adaptation mechanisms, a consequence of dual 
economic isolation. In the international context, this meant the isolation of so-
cialist states from the world economy. External market impulses such as the oil 
shocks or post-industrial development were too weak to have an impact on deci-
sions until it was too late. On the national level, the survival of non-market ra-
tionality was another force working against adaptation. Even in states where 
adaptive measures were taken, they were belated and marginal, focusing on cos-
metic issues instead of general problems. This attitude can be clearly identified as 
institutional sclerosis as described by Boschma–Lambooy (1999) and Steiner 
(2003) – but, unlike in market economies, there were no political or economic 
corrective mechanisms which would eventually result in reforms (Greenspan 
2007). Risk-avoidance and postponement became the usual policy response to 
identified problems. Finally, on the sub-national level, we can again draw atten-
tion to dependence: much more importantly than simple lobbying power, large 
industrial units were so strongly linked to local and regional economies that their 
collapse would have meant social catastrophe – something that would have been 
politically and morally unacceptable. On the other hand, inaction offered no rem-
edy, and lead to the further worsening of problems. 
The third factor is the new conditions of systematic change. These conditions 
once again acted against effective crisis management. The institutional instability 
of societies in transition made traditional planning methods untenable, while a 
radical approach, fusing planning, decisionmaking and execution (Faragó, 2004), 
was unavailable due to a lack of political and monetary capital. Therefore, the 
typical reaction of democratic governments was to use their resources to prevent 
the immediate collapse of industrial companies, and social measures to lessen the 
impact of unemployment in crisis regions. This step is consistent with early policy 
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responses made in the EEC (Ex post evaluation of 1994–99 Objective 2 pro-
grammes, 2003), although less effective because of low funds. Anti-industrial 
sentiment, often coupled with environmentalist concerns, was a less significant, 
but responsible factor for the weakness or non-existence of coherent restructuring 
attempts. This is a problematic issue. Herrschel (2007, p. 443) points out that 
“existing structures and associated social status and organisation were suddenly 
rendered ‘historic’ and lost their economic rationales. This included in particular 
the old industrial areas with their focus on monostructure depending on heavy 
industry and extractive work (coal mining).” However, this is only one side of the 
equation: we have to draw attention to the power of surviving institutional lega-
cies which continued to influence industrial (re)development. Know-how, social 
capital, management (in)competencies and other path-dependent factors survived 
well into post-socialism, even if they were “reimagined” to fit into the conceptual 
framework of the market economy. 
As a result of the above, the crisis of industrial regions in Central Europe was 
wider and more severe than in the west, with more restricted and less effective 
public involvement. Instead of active, policy-driven structural change, the process 
was overwhelmingly passive and market-driven, resulting in rapid de-industriali-
sation. This is both a positive and a negative phenomenon: it can be seen as a 
natural move to a modern, more service-driven economy, but it also involves de-
skilling, the loss of export potential, etc. While the common interpretation of “de-
industrialisation” suggests modernisation, in Central Europe’s crisis areas, an-
other form, the loss of industry with no replacement is also possible.11 The higher 
share of tertiary activities can be interpreted as an outcome of successful restruc-
turing, but also a sustenance economy where services are dominant only for a lack 
of alternatives, and entrepreneurship is a simple survival mechanism.12  The level 
of de-industrialisation varies from region to region and country to country; as a 
generalisation, we can say that it was more severe in south-eastern than north-
western post-socialist states (Table 6). As discussed later in the paper, industry 
and de-industrialisation has a different significance for central, intermediate and 
peripheral regions, which show different ways of integrating into the global econ-
omy. 
                                                     
11 
“When economists talk of ‘de-industrialisation’, they normally mean the shift from industry to 
services which is characteristic of the most advanced economies. ... In Kosovo, de-
industrialisation refers to a very different phenomenon. It means the collapse of industry and a 
return to the pre-industrial past.” (De-industrialisation and its consequences. A Kosovo story. 
2002, p. 5) For further discussion of industrial collapse, see Lux 2007. 
12
 Szalavetz (2003, p. 180), referring back to Rosenstein–Rodan and Hirschman, warns of a low 
level equilibrium trap, which can be “thought of as a massive coordination failure: several 
investments do not occur simply because other complementary investments are not made, and 
similarly, these latter investments are not forthcoming simply because the former are missing.” 
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Table 6 
De-industrialisation in Central Europe, 1990–1991 to 2003–2004 
Country Industrial employ-
ment in 1991 
Industrial employ-
ment in 2004 
Industrial employ-
ment in 2004 
(1991=100) 
Albania 242,500 127,000 52 
Bulgaria 1,785,000 967,900 54 
Croatia 694,700 469,000 68 
Czech Republic 1,958,900 1,844,400 94 
Hungary 1,349,400 906,300 67 
Macedonia 260,000 190,400 73 
Poland 5,483,100 3,509,900 64 
Romania 4,512,000 2,173,700 48 
Serbia and Montenegro 1,307,100 650,500 50 
Slovakia 848,900 846,000 100 
Slovenia 429,300 342,700 80 
Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of national statistical yearbooks. 
4.2 Transition processes and the dual economy 
Seventeen years after systematic change, it is possible to see the main trends 
which have reshaped the industrial structure of Central European states during 
their integration into global networks. The integration process takes place over 
decades, and with the passage of time, the special characteristics of post-socialism 
lessen while common European problems gain their place. 
It is arguable that the strongest force which continues to mould industry is the 
investment preferences of transnational corporations. Capital investment at the 
beginning of the 1990s was mostly in the form of acquiring privatised assets, 
while later, greenfield projects took their place. Companies owned by foreign 
interests surpass local ones in capitalisation, export potential and productivity, 
giving them a significant power to influence economic growth. The result is a 
dual economy (Barta, 2005; Domański, 2003), where there are strong, long-term 
differences between the efficiency of foreign and domestic industrial companies. 
Duality has both sectoral and spatial consequences. Transnational corporations 
show a preference towards manufacturing (especially machine industry and 
chemicals), leading to stronger modernisation in these branches. At the same 
time, their location choices are influential in spatial differentiation, leading to 
increasing differences between preferred and neglected regions. Privatisation 
reinforces previous differences, while greenfield investments create new ones. 
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Spatial differentiation occurs on national and subnational levels. Economic 
regulations, political/legal stability and investment incentives were decisive in 
national differences during the 1990s and continue to be relevant, if less influen-
tial today. On the subnational level, the most relevant factor was at first the acces-
sibility of western markets. Western border areas with good road connections 
benefited, and previously existing west-east development gradients became 
steeper. However, there are signs that simple accessibility has become less im-
portant over the years, while the importance of skilled labour is on the rise. 
Today, industry plays a role all over Central Europe, but this role is not the 
same everywhere. Its growth or decline means different things for different loca-
tions: for example, a manufacturing plant producing machinery would not be as 
valuable for the economic prosperity of a national capital as of a declining indus-
trial region – or a rural periphery struggling with high unemployment. When we 
examine industry’s significance in our economies, we have to discriminate on the 
basis of space, and consider the questions of development and modernisation in 
the regional context. Naturally, all regions have specific problems and opportuni-
ties, but it is possible to generalise: in my opinion, a threefold pattern is visible on 
the map of Central European industry, representing distinct regional types devel-
oping along different trajectories. 
Central regions (national capitals) were major manufacturing hubs in the so-
cialist period, preferred by economic development policy. During transformation, 
several of their companies closed down, and their place was taken by services. 
This change was relatively rapid, and although unemployment was significant for 
a few years, most employees could find new jobs in the service sector. The most 
innovative service activities, especially business services, are strongly concen-
trated in central regions (for the example of banking, see Gál 2005), as are ad-
ministrative/political functions. The development of central regions has been 
mostly tertiary, and in their chase, tertiarisation and de-industrialisation are asso-
ciated with successful transition. As a note of caution, it has to be remembered 
that this doesn’t mean development lacks an industrial component, and central 
regions managed to retain their presence in the highest value added branches such 
as pharmaceuticals, precision machinery and optics. Higher education and R&D 
are also located in large urban centres, including capitals. Finally, even when 
manufacturing is found in intermediate regions, corporate headquarters or branch 
offices are often maintained elsewhere – out of country or in capital cities. 
Industry continues to be a strong dynamising force in intermediate regions 
(that is, regions with an average urbanisation level, but without the problems of 
peripheries). They can benefit from service-based growth, but all available evi-
dence suggests that this in itself is insufficient for prosperity, and a mixture of 
industrial and tertiary activities is optimal. Western border regions are typically 
mentioned as winners of transition; the growth of automotive and machine indus-
try in the Vienna–Gyır–Bratislava trans-border area is just one example (Grosz 
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2006). On the other hand, they are not the only ones to belong to the category. 
Old Industrial Regions which have been successful in their adaptation by diversi-
fication into new industries or the innovative restructuring of their traditional 
branches start to become very strong contenders even if they do not benefit from 
an ideal geographic position. Their main strength is an established industrial mil-
lieu, with skilled workforce, technical education and supporting institutions.13 The 
role of these factors is becoming more and more important as pools of skilled 
labour are depleted across Central Europe and competition for employees in the 
previously preferred western border areas drives up wages. Labour shortage – 
which is a radically different situation from the beginning of the 1990s, when it 
was in abundant supply – also results in the re-evaluation of competitive advan-
tages which were taken for granted before. Today, unionised, more costly labour 
is much less of a disincentive than mainstream economists predicted – and it 
could be argued that it is actually a contributing factor to long-term success. 
Traditional and new peripheral regions are still coping with inherited and new 
backwardness. They were either under-industrialised, or their previous capacities 
were eroded so strongly that they can be considered lost. Most of the former are 
rural and/or eastern border areas, whose traditional light and food industries suf-
fered during transition, and are losing further ground to global competitors. Some 
Old Industrial Regions have also fallen into this trap with the downgrading of 
their human capital. It is a common observation that industrial depression leads to 
a decrease in skills thanks to emigration and the adverse social consequences of 
long-term unemployment. The result may be low level stabilisation as a periph-
eral region, instead of catch-up to intermediate ones. Their main problem today is 
no longer the lack of potential investors, but rather the fact that they can’t offer 
enough skilled workers to make investments worthwhile. Peripheral regions need 
the intervention of regional policy to re-industrialise, but these measures must be 
accompanied by social regeneration – first and foremost to reduce inactivity. On 
the other hand, contrary to usual expectations, not all peripheral industries are 
suffering. In certain branches and regions where cost advantages are still signifi-
cant, we can see the re-emergence of traditional light industry, increasingly serv-
ing the needs of international supplier networks.14 Their challenge is whether their 
advantages remain sustainable in the face of global competition, and whether they 
will be able to diversify into higher value added activities or even new branches 
before their cost advantages are eroded. 
                                                     
13
 Upper Silesia is probably the best example in this respect; for the role of human capital, see Geisle 
–Szczepańsk–Cymbrowski, 2005; for the role of institutional networks and policy, see Lux, 2008 
and Klasik–Heffner, 2001. 
14
 For example, textile companies in Eastern Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria have experienced new 
growth, and even become intermediaries between western and post-Soviet states (Kalantaridis–
Slava–Sochka, 2003; Smith et al. 2005). 
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Figure 5 
The distribution of automotive industry in Central Europe 
(2003, number of employees) 
 
Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of data from Worral–Donnelly–Morris, 2003. 
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The spatial structure created by the ongoing differentiation process is charac-
terised by a mixture of continuities and new phenomena. The location preferences 
of transnational corporations have played a role in modifying the picture of previ-
ous decades: some traditional industrial regions have lost in significance, while 
others emerged as new competitors. At the beginning of transformation, it was 
often prognosed that radical changes would take place, and the map of industry 
would be completely redrawn. But evidence suggests that these predictions did 
not come true. Continuities play a larger role than anticipated, as Figure 5 demon-
strates through the example of automotive industry. Even allowing for differences 
in labour and capital intensive forms of production, it is apparent that manufac-
turing centres are almost always located in locales with strong industrial tradi-
tions, and the largest production facilities are all old ones – by far outstripping 
greenfield projects. This continuity is either manifested in the survival and trans-
formation of traditional corporations, or the adaptation and evolution of industrial 
millieus. New plants are located in old regions, even OIRs, as the successful 
transformation of Central Transdanubia or Upper Silesia demonstrates. Based on 
my interviews with decisionmakers and entrepreneurs in one Polish and two Hun-
garian OIRs, the single most important source of growth potential is the avail-
ability of skilled labour. The relative abundance at the beginning of the 1990s no 
longer exists as tertiarisation proceeded and deskilling took place. Secondary 
education, and strong technical universities were instrumental in replacing losses, 
and where they didn’t succeed – which was unfortunately the case in both Hun-
garian examples – the scarcity of skilled professionals became the main impedi-
ment before FDI inflows. 
Do the development processes in Central European industry point towards 
convergence towards the European core, or the re-constitution of pre-war periph-
eral positions? It was often feared that the dual industrial structure of transition 
societies would result in deskilling and disembeddedness, or “desert cathedrals”. 
Pavlínek–Smith (1998), recounting arguments from Dunning, Grabher, Lipietz 
and Smith, pointed out that “defensive structural change” – focusing on low or 
medium technology activities, the lack of innovative products and relying on la-
bour cost as the most important competitive advantage – would lead to the preser-
vation of core-periphery arrangements. It follows, then, that even in re-industrial-
ised regions where FDI inflows are strong, catch-up is an illusion, and moderni-
sation relative, as the resulting structures will be just as crisis-vulnerable as so-
cialist ones.  
This concern is not altogether unrealistic, and has to remain a cautionary note 
to decisionmakers and regional scientists. Central European industry could at the 
moment be described as semi-peripheral – not purely relying on cheap, unskilled 
labour, but still very distant from the optimal level of high value added activities. 
However, I consider semi-peripheral industry better than the alternative. Semi-
peripheral industry can play a positive role in regional development, if it keeps 
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the economy active, provides employment and maintains industrial millieus – or, 
it stabilises. In the case of peripheries, old and new, the effect is even more bene-
ficial as a generator of growth and a chance to escape disadvantageous situations. 
Economic policy must be able to distinguish between these two roles, since they 
do not fulfil the same function. For peripheral regions, the positive outcome is 
regeneration, reintegration and social improvement. For intermediate regions, it is 
a stepping stone towards higher embeddedness and endogenous growth.  
What can states and regions do to favourably influence their industrial devel-
opment? First, they have to recognise how different regions require different so-
lutions. But they also have to acknowledge their limitations. The main tool of 
public policy today is no longer the creation of new industrial centres – neither 
political realities, nor public funds allow this form of intervention. Instead, policy 
should provide assistance in institution-building and preparing the ground for 
investments which will come from the private sector if the appropriate conditions 
are present. To be efficient, this requires a degree of administrative decentralisa-
tion, especially in the realm of economic policy. So far, only Poland has genu-
inely moved towards decentralisation among post-socialist states, and it appears 
that the results were positive. It remains to be seen if others will follow the exam-
ple. 
4.3 Spatial development in a transforming world 
How did Central European regions experience change during transformation? 
Annex II./a shows that by 1990–1991, the degree of de-industrialisation had al-
ready been significant across Central Europe. In all states except Romania, strong 
tertiarisation took place. Two decades before, only central regions and regions 
with large cities over approximately 250.000 inhabitants were affected by this 
trend; now, it spread everywhere. South-eastern states now had a higher share of 
industrial employment than north-western ones.15 But on the national level, tradi-
tional divides and spatial structures survived: it can be seen in the differences 
between the Czech and Slovakian Republics, Hungary’s “energy axis” in the 
northern counties, or Romania’s divide between Transylvania and Old Romanian 
areas. Overall, the concentration of industrial employment decreased when we 
compare it to previous decades: regions where employment was previously highly 
concentrated lost share (but remained significant), while under-industrialised ones 
gained some. 
Regional investment statistics (Annex II./b), which offer an insight into proc-
esses of change, show an opposite process: instead of deconcentration, the pre-
                                                     
15
 This was as much an outcome of belated development as the continuation of early socialist growth 
policies – especially in Romania. 
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vailing trend was strong concentration into industrialised regions and decline in 
peripheral ones. Unfortunately, there wasn’t enough data to construct a good 
comparative map about per capita investment levels in Central Europe, as figures 
were sometimes given in percentiles instead of national currency, and strong in-
flation during the early transition period would have made the results suspect in 
any case. Therefore, the annex shows the share of industrial investments in the 
total – which can shed some light on national trends, but doesn’t enable a good 
global comparison.16 Although investment volumes were falling everywhere, their 
contraction in Poland is the most visible, showing a sharp contrast between the 
south-western industrial heartlands and rural peripheries. Hungary’s situation was 
similar, although decline was smaller early on due to successful policies encour-
aging foreign investment. North-western counties close to the border were the 
major winners of the process, along with the capital; Old Industrial Regions out-
side the previous area and rural peripheries its losers. In Romania, industrial in-
vestments were still the most significant, and showed concentration in mining and 
heavy industrial centres. 
Based on these two dimensions, we can conclude that in the early transition 
period, the spatial structure of industry reached a tipping point. Before 1990, 
Central European countries made relatively successful efforts to industrialise 
backwards areas, either as a form of regional policy (especially in Hungary and 
Poland) or a general drive (as in Romania). After 1990, peripheries had to face 
changed circumstances. Their products were often outdated, and there was little 
hope for investments to remedy this situation as social considerations had to take 
a backseat. To borrow Gorzelak’s (1998) regional typology, while negative dis-
continuity was the threat for Old Industrial Regions, peripheral regions faced the 
threat of negative continuity, or conserving former disadvantageous positions. 
Annexes III./a–1–2 and III./b show the transformed industrial landscape of 
Central Europe at the time of EU accession. What stands out is the continuing de-
industrialisation of post-socialist countries. The degree of this process was such 
that two separate maps had to be constructed – one using the scales for 1990–
1991, and a separate one where interior differences would be more visible. In 
employment, only one Polish region, Upper Silesia, exceeded 35% in industrial 
employment; from all regions mapped, one half did not reach this level. Only 
three regions exceeded 50%: fifteen years before, one quarter of the total did, and 
in 1970, almost one half. The diverse role of industry is evident from Annex 
III./a-2. The most developed central regions show the lowest levels of industrial 
employment – but so do eastern peripheries. Troubled regions can be found 
among those where the ratio is highest – but also others which grow dynamically. 
Development level cannot be simply linked to sectoral composition; we must look 
                                                     
16
 Data for Yugoslavia was available, but I decided to exclude it on grounds of appearing grossly 
inaccurate. 
 36
into distinct region types to correctly appraise the value of industry in our trans-
forming societies. Comparisons of industrialisation and GDP rankings verify this 
conclusion: the first spots are taken by service-driven regions, but they are imme-
diately followed by intermediate industrial regions with strong positions in manu-
facturing (Figure 6). Even four significant Old Industrial Regions – Közép-
Dunántúl, Moravskoslezsko, Śląskie and Pomorskie – have made it to the list. The 
continued significance of industry is also seen when we consider sub-national 
patterns. Even with de-industrialisation, traditional divides and development gra-
dients survive: the southwest–northeast division of Poland, the “energy axis” of 
Hungary, the continued importance of former industrial centres in Romania, etc. 
Figure 6 
The top 20 Central European regions ranked by per capita GDP 
(2004, PPP, % of EU-27 average) 
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Note: White columns indicate service-based central regions; black columns indicate intermediate 
regions, whose growth is primarily based on manufacturing. 
Source: Edited by the Author on the basis of data from Eurostat. 
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Investments statistics, seen in Annex III./b, show wide differences. In Bul-
garia, masked by low overall levels, there is a more than twofold difference be-
tween the south-western capital region and the northern central one. Although 
regional statistics couldn’t be found, reports regarding industry in Romania sug-
gest that similar polarisation takes place. In Poland, western border areas and the 
capital are the primary targets, as are in Hungary: however, while the latter saw an 
overall higher investment level, its distribution within the country was less equal. 
Northern Hungary had the single highest investment ratio per employee in Central 
Europe, while Southern Transdanubia fell into the lowest bracket. 
As in previous periods, the effects of industrial transformation are highly vari-
able in different countries. The Czech Republic inherited Czechoslovakia’s more 
advanced industries; this, coupled with fast macroeconomic stabilisation, eased 
adjustment. The government proposed wide-encompassing sectoral programmes, 
fast privatisation, support for small and medium entrepreneurships and the 
reorganisation of problem companies to ease transformational recession. 
Czechoslovakian industry struggled with four spatial problems: dependence on 
coal and steel in Moravia and Western Bohemia, monofunctional cities, areas 
whose economy was dominated by large-scale industry, and underdeveloped, 
peripheral industrial regions (Myant, 1995). From these problems, the first was 
especially significant in the Czech Republic. The Ostrava-Karvina industrial ag-
glomeration was affected by mine closures and the decline of metallurgy; the 
policy responses involved innovative restructuring, economic diversification as 
well as institution-building. The weakness of administrative decentralisation hurt 
Ostrava’s adjustment; its transformation was much less impressive than 
neighbouring Upper Silesia’s (Nesporova, 1998; Sucháček, 2005). 
The Czech Republic’s overall de-industrialisation was minimal, although there 
was some movement in space towards smaller settlements. New investments 
show concentration into the central region; foreign capital found it advantageous 
to exploit existing networks and traditions. Between 1990 and 2000, 47.6% of all 
FDI flowed into Prague and a further 11.9% to Central Bohemia. State investment 
policy, through the CzechInvest agency, had an alleviative effect: from the funds 
it attracted, only 2.5% and 18.8% went to these areas, while Ústí nad Labem and 
Olmütz reached 30.9% and 12.1%, respectively (Young 2004). 
Slovakia, although it had a similar level of industrial employment as its Czech 
counterpart, had a more troubled inheritance in post-socialism. Sectoral problems 
(e.g. the overpresence of military industry) were compounded by regional ones: 
the eastern part of the country struggled with surfacing hidden unemployment and 
peripherality. Until the late 1990s, foreign investments were meagre, and they 
were overwhelmingly concentrated in the west, while in the east, old companies 
dominated. A strong gradient became visible (Table 7). Embeddedness was lower 
than in the Czech Republic, with less advanced supply relations; companies 
mainly manufactured low value-added products. 
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Table 7 
The uneven distribution of industry in Slovakia (2000, %) 
Region Market Value Added Productivity by 
VA (SK=100) 
Employment 
Bratislava 31.9 24.0 195.0 12.3 
Western Slovakia 27.0 38.2 101.0 38.0 
Central Slovakia 19.4 20.3 80.0 25.4 
Eastern Slovakia 21.7 17.5 72.0 24.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Sectoral Operational Programme Industry and Services [of Slovakia] 2003, pp. 7–8. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, reforms were passed to encourage new in-
vestments. Industrial parks were a successful measure to increase foreign interest; 
although investments there are still spatially uneven, parks in the east successfully 
attracted large investors, often in traditional branches (e.g. US Steel Košíce and 
chemicals producer Chemko). The brownfield form is also more popular: three of 
Slovakia’s five brownfield-based industrial parks are in the Eastern Slovakian re-
gion (www.sario.sk). Industry has gained a pivotal role in post-accession devel-
opment policy. In the 2007–2013 strategies, the emphasis is on industrial support 
structures and productive infrastructure. 
Poland faced the return of old problems. Development gaps widened in the in-
dustrial-agrarian, urban-rural and western-eastern relations (Blazyca 2001). The 
most serious crisis emerged in Upper Silesia (then composed of three voivode-
ships), where almost 44% of industrial employees worked in the declining coal 
and steel sector. Although it was believed that the region would face protracted 
decay, innovative restructuring in traditional branches, diversification into new 
industries (especially automotive industry) and exploiting the urban functions of 
the Katowice agglomeration proved more successful than anticipated. A crucial 
factor was the institution-building of the local elite, whose bottom-up activity 
made Upper Silesia the test-bed of Polish regional policy. Successful measures, 
such as the regional contract between the government and regional administration, 
and the creation of Special Economic Zones were adopted elsewhere in the coun-
try, although in other regions, different solutions were sometimes more fruitful 
(e.g. endogenous growth in Łódz vs. the investment-driven path of Silesia). 
Foreign investments showed a preference for large urban agglomerations, par-
ticularly the Mazowieckie, Upper Silesian and Wielkopolskie regions (20.7%, 
17.3% and 11.9% of the national investment volume between 1990 and 2000). 
Domański’s studies demonstrate an urban-rural dichotomy of preference for 
capital- and labour-intensive manufacturing. Road accessibility and skilled labour 
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were the leading location advantages, but in recent years, services provided by 
local governments and local market access have gained in importance. Among 
advantages, there is a demonstrable movement from costs to markets and special 
skills, and supplier networks are on the rise (Domański, 2003, 2004). The spatial 
development priorities of the state encourage endogenous growth in advanced 
regions and raising activity on the peripheries. 
Hungary’s total industrial production fell the least in Central Europe from 
1989 to 1993, but this masked an ongoing differentiation process: deep recession 
in certain branches (60% production decline in machine industry and metallurgy, 
36% in mining and 33% in chemicals) and dynamic growth in others which saw 
foreign investments immediately after systematic change. The spatial outcome 
was favourable for the central region and the Vienna-Budapest axis,17 but meant 
depression for Northern Hungary and some parts of Southern Transdanubia, 
where mining and other crisis industries were concentrated. The harshest decline, 
however, was in peripheral industry. In the collapse of multi-branch companies, 
their rural branches were the first to be cut loose; at the same time, agricultural 
cooperatives were dismantled and their industrial activities mostly disappeared. 
In the second phase of transition, the duality of industry increased. Hungary 
had an early advantage due to legal reforms and other factors including tax bene-
fits and political-economic stability. However, the modernising influence of FDI 
gradually started to decrease after the mid–1990s, while its regional embedded-
ness (e.g. supplier relations) were still weak, and it overwhelmingly favoured 
Central Hungary, (65% in 2000) Central and Estern Transdanubia (15% com-
bined) while the remaining four regions collectively had only 20%. It is increas-
ingly evident that new sources of competitiveness need to be found. Szanyi (2003) 
proposes the re-evaluation of public policy along the following lines: 
− skilled, healthy workforce (involving reforms in healthcare and education), 
− national leading products and their promotion, 
− support for capital accumulation in domestic entrepreneurships, 
− infrastructure and communication networks, 
− the mobilisation of underutilised regional resources. 
Support for local production systems (supply relations, clusters, industrial 
parks) and regional innovation, as well as administrative decentralisation are re-
quired to break from low added-value activities. Unfortunately, the documents of 
development policy still treat industry as a sort of taboo, or are oblivious of its 
significance beyond generic support for encouraging investments. Centralist re-
                                                     
17In Budapest, extensive de-industrialisation took place. Other than short-term social costs, the most 
important challenge was how to handle brownfield areas left behind by collapsed giants (for a 
thorough examination, see Barta et al 2006). 
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flexes on the part of the national government, as well as local provincialism, play 
an adverse role. 
Post-socialism, or more accurately post-Stalinism in Romania lead to an espe-
cially severe transformational recession. Its overdeveloped but outdated energy 
sector and heavy industry were even more anachronistic on the world market than 
other socialist economies. The result was drastic contraction: 52% fall in indus-
trial employment until 2004, and decline from 46.2 to 25.2 in GDP share. In ad-
dition to tertiarisation, post-traditional ruralisation, population movement from 
urban to rural areas, and industry to agriculture became visible (Maniu–Kallai– 
Popa, 2001). Although depression was ubiquitous, the Hunedoara area and the Jiu 
valley stand out as especially problematic. A 1997 World Bank programme gave 
support for mine closures and diversification, but while its social components 
were executed, local development was feeble and the repatriation of miners also 
failed (Ianos–Popescu, 1989; Haney–Shkaratan, 2003). Emergence from the 
crisis only really started after 2000, since Romania wasn’t attractive to foreign 
investors. The regional concentration of FDI was high, primarily going into the 
Bucharest agglomeration and the western region (especially Timişoara). In recent 
years, there has been a slight evening out, particularly with the growth of major 
urban areas, but the capital’s share remains at a high level. 
Among the former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia’s industrial transition was the 
smoothest; inheriting the federation’s most modern branches, serious decline was 
confined into the heavy industrial Maribor and Podravska areas. We can point to a 
traditional presence on western markets going back to the 1970s, and effective 
public policy as additional helpful factors. A 1999 industrial development con-
cept, recognising the threats of semi-peripheral growth, recommended focusing 
on high value-added, innovative industrial branches. A national development plan 
was completed in 2001, before EU accession; this, and later documents were still 
dedicated to structural change. 
Post-socialist states in South-Eastern Europe, including former Yugoslav re-
publics, Bulgaria and Albania, share many similarities in their industrial trans-
formation, most prominently stronger state control and the destructive de-indus-
trialisation mentioned in chapter 4.1, although Romania and to a lesser extent 
Croatia have been successful in joining Central European development trajecto-
ries. Continuing state ownership is semi-successful in warding off industrial col-
lapse, but at the cost of considerable hidden unemployment and postponed ad-
justment. Decline in traditional branches wasn’t counteracted by alternatives; the 
dilemma of these states is if, and how the remaining industry can serve as a basis 
for reindustrialisation and new growth. It is not evident whether creative destruc-
tion or a more careful approach would be better, but these questions may mean 
the difference between catching up and staying on the periphery. 
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5 Conclusion 
Central Europe’s industrial transformations in the 20th century and at the turn of 
the new millennium demonstrate the dual presence of continuities and change. On 
one hand, while all periods discussed in this paper had their particulars and vola-
tile political rearrangements, the institutional sphere was a lot more path-depend-
ent. Central planning in the late 1940s was not foreign to states which had ex-
perimented with tightened controls in the interwar years and wartime economy; 
likewise, the reform period of socialism could build on concepts elaborated, but 
not realised (and often vigorously attacked) during Stalinism. Finally, the reac-
tions of governments immediately after systematic change inherited numerous 
reflexes from the planners of later socialism. Of course, none of this should be 
construed as a denial of substantial changes; rather, an argument for seeing in-
dustrial development as a more organic, gradual process. Three closely correlated 
dimensions in this process appear significant. 
The first dimension is state control. State control was extended in response to 
perceived market failures after World War One, and became total in the wartime 
economy. Central Europe’s modernisation and catch up attempts also played a 
role: it was commonly accepted that closing development gaps would require 
public direction and support. These beliefs were synthesised in the totalitarian 
ideologies of the 1940s and 1950s; however, they were plagued by horrid dys-
functions which were only acceptable as long as all other considerations were 
subordinated to military and political (ideological) dictates. Homogenised indus-
trial policy had to be relaxed; this in turn lead to divergent national models at-
tempting to reform central planning, primarily in the area of regulations. By this 
time, however, socialism was “done” as most of its major projects had concluded, 
and adjustments, including regional policy experiments, were only minor. Symp-
toms of crisis did not initiate an adaptation process, and conservation prevailed. 
By 1990, Central European economies were struggling with postponed industrial 
crisis. Lacking the resources and political capital for effective restructuring, state 
control had to be reduced – accordingly, the location patterns of private entities, 
predominantly from the west, became the strongest force of change on the indus-
trial landscape. Although direct intervention is currently untenable, states can still 
influence development, primarily in institution-building, physical infrastructure 
and facilitating the settlement of innovative industrial branches. 
The second dimension is economic development, which runs parallel with state 
control. In the interwar years, development trajectories were divergent despite 
some common elements: they progressed differently in Czechoslovakia, Central 
Europe’s only advanced state; in Poland and Hungary which had a medium de-
velopment level, and in the more peripheral others. The gradual economic isola-
tion of Central Europe, war and socialist ideology homogenised this diverse field 
through uniform recipes which denied national particulars as much as regional or 
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local ones. The 1960s reforms, although they didn’t break the socialist paradigm, 
represented interior divergence and external convergence (growing differences 
between socialist states but slightly decreasing differences when compared to 
market economies). In contrast, the situation was the opposite in the 1970s and 
1980s: economic and political retrenchment, which lead to interior homogeneity, 
but a departure from world trends. It is a cautionary note that transformation 
proved how illusionary this separation was: after 1990, Central European econo-
mies had to return to the global mainstream one way or another. The question is 
how this takes place: will they reduce their development deficit and join the 
European core, or be increasingly marginalised? 
The final dimension, spatial development, may be interpreted within individual 
countries, but also for the sum of Central European space. Spatial differentiation 
is a natural by-product of economic and social processes, and in semi-peripheral 
Central Europe, there were always strong contrasts between developed and back-
wards areas. Until the end of the 20th century, one of the most important differen-
tiating forces was the uneven distribution of industry. Differences between urban 
industrialised regions and small-town or rural peripheries were strong in the 
interwar period, while under Stalinism, preference for a few growth poles and 
conscious discrimination against everything else exacerbated them. At the same 
time, even preferred areas were characterised by one-sided development and ur-
banisation shortages (a different matter from under-urbanisation, a “normal” 
characteristic of Central European space). Adjustments and regional policy ex-
periments in the 1960s and 1970s were also mainly industrial, although they were 
more of a social measure and maybe represented a different ideology than “main-
stream socialism” – labour-intensive production, resurrecting local traditions, etc. 
The value of industry was questioned after 1990, both as a consequence of eco-
nomic failure in socialism’s showcase regions, but also in light of post-industrial 
development. However, while tertiarisation is universal in all regions, its signifi-
cance is not. Only central regions could succeed based on a predominantly ser-
vice-based economy (and they maintained footholds in the most innovative in-
dustrial branches), while in intermediate and peripheral ones, hopes to this effect 
proved largely illusory. In some cases, tertiarisation is simply an outcome of eco-
nomic collapse, a return to pre-modern conditions. Public policy has yet to accu-
rately evaluate the continuing significance of industry in regional development. 
Strategies created by individual regions contain industrial elements, but national 
concepts often neglect them outside general statements. It appears that concepts 
prepared for the 2007–2013 programming period show improvement in this re-
spect, but how they will eventually play out is still to be seen. 
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Annex I./a 
Industrial employment as a share of the total (1970–1971, %) 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks 
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Annex I./b 
The level of industrial investments per employee (1970–1971, USD) 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks 
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Annex II./a 
Industrial employment as a share of the total (1990–1991, %) 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks. 
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Annex II./b 
Industrial investment as a share of the total (1990–1991, %) 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks 
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Annex III./a-1 
Industrial employment as a share of the total (2003–2004, %) 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks. 
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Annex III./a-2 
Industrial employment as a share of the total, adjusted range (2003–2004, %) 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks. 
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Annex III./b 
The level of industrial investments per employee (2003–2004, USD) 
 
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks 
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